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PUTTING IN ONE'S OWN CASE ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION.
z. THE ORTHODOX RULE AND THE FEDERAL RULE. The great
question that arises as to the scope of the cross-examination is
whether the opponent may, upon the cross-examination, elicit
the witness' knowledge as to facts that constitute part of the
op ponent's own case, or whether he is confined to the matters
already dealt with in the direct examination or, at least, to
topics connected therewith.
(a) In England, and in the United States down through the
first quarter of the x8oos, there was apparently but one view
upon this subject. There seems, indeed, to have been no ques-
tion at all; so that in English judicial opinions an express state-
ment of the rule is scarcely to be found. That rule-which
may be termed the orthodox one-adopted the former of the
above alternatives:
z829, Sutherland, J., in Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. 483.
485: "When a witness has been sworn in chief, the opposite
party may not only cross-examine him in relation to the point
which he was called to prove, but he may examine him as to
any matter embraced in the issue. He may establish his de-
fense by him without calling any other witnesses. If he is a
competent witness to the jury for any purpose, he is so for all
purposes. "
(b) But in the year 1827, Chief-justice Gibson of Pennsyl-
vania, in dealing with a related point, chanced to remark (with-
out citing .an authority) that, as the ordinary rule, the cross-
examining party should not "prove his case by evidence ex-
tracted on cross-examination," and also that a witness may not
be cross-examined to facts which are "wholly foreign to what
he has already testified:"
1827, Gibson, C. J., in Ellmaker v. Buckley, x6 S. & R. 72,
77: "A witness may not be cross-examined to facts which are
wholly foreign to the points in issue (and, I would add, to what
he has already testified) for the purpose of contradicting him
by other evidence. . .. . In ordinary cases, the witness
may be cross.examined by the party adverse to him whose wit-
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ness he is at the time, and even then only to discredit him or to
bring out something supposed to be withheld; . . . [but
this is subject to enlargement in the Court's discretion in special
cases], and for myself, I would not, without further considera-
tion, pronounce the exercise of the discretion, depending as it
does on circumstances which cannot be fully made to appear in
a court of error, to be a legitimate subject of a bill of excep-
tions. If, then, a party may not prove his case by evidence
extracted on a cross-examination after he has proposed his case
to the jury, afortiori he may not do so before."
The remarks put forth in this opinion (which were by no
means consistent with themselves, and contained the germs of
a practice that would have been repudiated by the great Chief-
Justice) seem to have received no further attention at the time
in other courts. But in 1840, Mr. Justice Story (also speaking
obiter, and also without citing a single authority) was found to
lay down in the Federal Supreme Court a rule of similar
purport, though of slightly different phraseology-a difference,
nevertheless, which has served more than anything else to
introduce the extreme rule (equally unanticipated by the
learned Federal judge) which now prevails in many jurisdic-
tions. This rule-which may be termed the Federal rule,
because through Mr. Justice Story's sponsorship it lost its local
character and obtained its wide currency-was as follows:
1840, Story, J., in Philadehia & T. R. Co. v. Stirnpson, 14
Pet. 448, 461: "[The answers in controversy were inadmissi-
ble] upon the broader principle (now well established, although
sometimes lost sight of in our loose practice at trials) that a
party has no right to cross-examine any witness except as to
facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in
his direct examination. If he wishes to examine him to other
matters, he must do so by making the witness his own, and
calling him as such in the subsequent progress of the cause."
Where the great Federal judge-the most versatile and
encyclopedic mind among American jurists-obtained the
"settled" rule thus first introduced into circulation, it is diffi-
cult to say.' He did not find it in the orthodox and accepted
i. z874, Dunne, C. J., in Rush vz. French, z Ariz. 99, 133, 25 Pac. 816:
"We cannot know what the Court meant by saying that the principle involved
in the second declaration was 'well settled.' They could not have meant well
settled in England, for such had never been the rule there; nor. in Massachu-
setts, Vermont, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, or Missouri. The case they had
in hand was from Pennsylvania, and the rule in that state was, it is true, set-
tled, as the Supreme Court says; but whether they meant that, or that it was
settled in the United States Circuit Court for Pennsylvania, or what they
meant, we cannot tell."
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common-law practice either of England or of the United States;
for there appear to have been up to that time (except in Penn-
sylvania) no other rulings to that effect. It is clear that the
earlier practice, as ascertainable from prior rulings in half a
dozen jurisdictions, had been in harmony with the orthodox
English practice. It is possible that Mr. Justice Story was
merely expounding the Pennsylvania rule, as he was bound to
do for a Federal trial Court sitting in Pennsylvania. 2 It is also
possible, and even probable, that he had in mind a passage,
uttered just a hundred years before, in which Lord Hardwicke's
recollection, when sitting as Chancellor, of the practice at the
common-law bar, is made to serve as authority:
1740, L. C. Hardwicke, in Dean of Ely v. Stewart, 2 Atk. 44,
"laid down the following rules in this cause: . . Where
at law a witness is produced to a single point by the plaintiff or
defendant, the adverse party may cross-examine as to the same
individual point, but not to any new matter; so in equity, if a
great variety of facts and points arise, and a plaintiff examines
only as to one, the defendant may cross examine to the same
point, but cannot make use of such witness to prove a different
fact."3
The practice at common law at the time when the Chancellor
spoke,, does not bear him out in his assertion;4 nor can his
authority to speak of the common-law rule be regarded as
weighty, for his experience at that bar had been comparatively
scanty. 6 So far as the practice in chancery may have seemed
to Justice Story to have a bearing, it was hardly fitted to come
into competition with the common-law rule as a claimant for
favor. The rule in chancery was indeed apparently what Lord
Hardwicke declared it to be (though, oddly enough, there
appears to have been no other ruling than his own during the
course of a century). 6 But the system of cross-examination in
2. Compare the remark of C. J. Dunne, in note i, suj5ra.
3. The same judge is elsewhere reported as follows: z743, L. C. Hard-
wicke, in Vaillant z'. Dodemead, 2 Atk. 524 (said that "wherever at law a
party calls upon his own attorney for a witness, the other side may cross-
examine him, but that must be only relative to the same matter, and not as to
other points of the cause"; but this is explained easily enough as stating the
limited effect of the waiver of the privilege.)
4. Of the later practice there can be no doubt whatever.
5. He was only three years at the common-law bar, then fifteen years at
the chancery bar, then Chief justice of the King's Bench (mainly in criminal
cases) for three years; and had been four years Lord Chancellor in i74o.
6. Gresley, Evidence in Equity 5o, and Daniell, Chancery Pleading and
Practice, I, 22, cite only this case of Ely v. Stewart.
ONE'S OWN CASE ON CROSS-EXAMINATION. 29
chancery had long been notoriously a failure, and was already
practically abandoned as a weapon of defense." It was, there-
fore, singular that Justice Story (if indeed he was thinking of
the chancery rule) should not merely have deviated without
precedent into a practice having in this respect conditions pecu-
liar to itself and differing radically from the common law, but
should have gone for guidance to a system of cross-examination
which had for a generation or more been stunted and devital-
ized. In any event, the rule thus presented by him to the coun-
try at large must be regarded as a sudden innovation upon the
hitherto general and accepted practice of the common law, both
in England and in the United States. Whatever its later cur-
rency, it came before the profession at that time as an inter-
loper, with all the weight of experience against it. It was
bound to justify itself, in reason and in policy. Whether it has
done so may now be considered.
2. ORIGINAL FoRm OF THE FEDERAL RULE. Before consider-
ing the respective policies of these opposing rules, it is neces-
sary to keep in mind that in their original form they were
never put forward by their eminent sponsors as anything but
rules of customary and normal practice, subject always to the
general principle that the trial Court may, in its dis-
cretion, allow exceptions.. Chief Justice Gibson, the very
progenitor of the Federal rule, declared radically that he
"would not without further consideration pronounce the
exercise of the discretion, depending as it does upon circum-
stances which cannot be fully made to appear in a court of
error, to be a legitimate subject of a bill of exceptions." In
the Pennsylvania and the Federal Supreme courts-the two
most notably associated with this rule-this controlling prin-
ciple of discretion has from time to time been expressly empha-
sized. In this pure form of these rules, then, the supposed dis-
7. 1837, Gresley, Evidence in Equity, 5o, note ("Cross-examination, except
on this point [to credit], has fallen very much into disuse"); Plumer, V. C.,
quoted in Gresley, ubisufra 75 ("The glaring defect in the system of taking
evidence in chancery, and that which renders it insufficient for the elucidation
of truth, is the total exclusion of everything like an effective cross-examina-
tion. Each party is ignorant, not only of what the witnesses on the other side
have said, but of what they have been asked. In such total darkness, a cross-
examination is seldom attempted ; the most experienced practitioners, I be-
lieve, recommend it only in cases where the witness is one whom it would be
necessary or prudent to have examined in chief; . . . [this] leaves the
examination in chancery a mere ex .arte proceeding, and little better than
evidence by affidavit").
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advantages, which have been by the champions of either put
forward as marking the enforcement of the other rule in
extreme cases, are reduced to a minimum, and may often be
practically inconsiderable. The trial Court's discretion is
intended to give a flexibility that will obviate these occasional
disadvantages. Thus the only question of controversy that
would properly have remained would be whether the one or the
other is better suited to be the foundation for the usual (not
the necessary or invariable) order of evidence. But. unfor-
tunately, this same qualification, always assumed by the.
inventors of the rule as an inseparable part of it, has usually
been lost sight of by their followers-at least among the adher-
ents of the Federal rule. While seldom expressly denying the
principle of discretion, they have come practically to ignore it.
By ignoring it, they have reduced the rule itself to a fixed and
deadened formula; and they have thus emphasized and made
actual and frequent the possibilities of practical harm which
were otherwise only latent in it. In considering, therefore, the
policy of the Federal rule as actually administered by most of
the courts adhering to it, account must be taken of the draw-
backs which attend its actual workings in this extreme form,
even though they were not inherent in the rule as originally
advanced and correctly applied.
Furthermore, the rule has suffered degeneration in another
respect, in the hands of most of its modern adherents. For it
would seem that both of the eminent judges, Gibson and Story.
who promulgated it, understood it to exclude only the putting
in of the opponent's own case-i e., the new facts constituting
his affirmative defense (whether strictly appropriate to an
affirmative plea or not); yet their language made it possible
for their followers to forbid an examination to anything but the
precise matters testified by the witness on the direct examination, even
to matters which properly concerned the calling party's own
case under the allegations of his pleading. This extreme inter-
pretation of the rule has also led to the emphasizing of special
disadvantages, which musi be reckoned with in weighing the
respective policies of the two rules as actually administered.
The arguments against the Federal rule are both entitled and
obliged to deal with it in the degenerate form in which to-day
it is practiced in most of its jurisdictions.
3. POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RULE. The Federal rule has
labored under one notable disadvantage-namely, it has seldom
found, among judges of accepted eminence, a defender other than
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its progenitor, Chief justice Gibson. In searching the reasons
upon which the rule is supposed to be founded, attention is
attracted by the circumstance that the greatest names are
found as expositors of the reasons against the rule. The best
single statement of what can be said on behalf of the rule seems
to be the following:
x856, Handy, J., in Mfask v. State, 32 Miss. 405, 430: "I
consider this latter [or Federal] rule as founded on the sounder
reason and as establishing the better practice. Cross-examina-
tion, ex vi termini, must relate to what has been stated by the
witness on his examination in chief, and it could not properly
be denominated cross-examination when it extended to new
matter, about which the witness had given no testimony.
Suppose the first witness introduced by the plaintiff testifies
only to an isolated fact, as, for example, the execution of a
document relied on by the plaintiff as evidence; would it be
competent for the defendant to anticipate the merits of the case
to be developed by'the plaintiff, and, by way of cross-examina-
tion, to examine the witness as to matters which he supposed
to be involved in establishing the plaintiff's case, and go into
the merits of the whole case? Such a course would scarcely be
sanctioned or tolerated by any court. And why? Because it
would tend to subvert the regular order of presenting the case,
and lead to confusion. ....... The same principle which
governs tle pleadings between the parties should regulate the
exhibition of the proof upon the trial; and as each pleading
should be strictly in answer to that to which it applies, so the
cross-examination of each witness should be confined to the
matter testified to in his examination in chief, in ordir to pro-
duce certainty and distinctness in ascertaining the facts to be
proved. This course, while it is tanctioned by the rules of
logical proceeding, can be productive of no prejudice to a party
desiring to prove by the witness other matters than such as are
embraced in the examination in chief; for it is well settled that
he may, afterwards, introduce him as his own witness, to prove
any matters pertinent to the merits of the cause, and that the
adverse party having called him. is thereby precluded from ob-
jecting to his competency, or from impeaching his credibility.
These reasons suggest the following comments:
(a) A reason advanced by Chief-Justice Gibson is that it is
"foreign to the end of cross-examination . . . to allow the
witness to be cross-examined to every transaction within his
knowledge." This, however, is a mere begging of the very
question at issue. Furthermore, the general nature of the
common-law arrangement of examinations suggests precisely
the contrary-namely, that the function of cross-examination is
to exhaust the witness' knowledge on all points on which he
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has any that is relevant to the trial. A much more natural
assumption is the one made by the judges later quoted-namely,
that the "primary obligation of the oath is to elicit the whole
truth."
(b) Another reason put foward is that this rule "tends to
.promote order and method." If by this be meant that the rule is
in theory more orderly, in that it aims to keep the facts of the
opponent's case from confusing the jury and complicating the
proceedings until the proponent has fully set forth his -wn
case, this much may be conceded for the rule in its pure form, 8
although in its usual form there is not even the semblance of
such a scientific demarcation, since the rule turns on whatever
line of facts the proponent may have chosen to take up in the
direct examination. But if it be meant that simplicity is
actually attained and that confusion is in fact avoided, the
precise contrary has been shown by experience.
(c) Another suggested reason is that the calling party other-
wise loses the benefit of cross-examination on the facts forming part
of the opponent's case. But why should he not lose the benefit
of cross-examination? He has called the witness, and the sole
purpose of cross-examination is to enable the non-calling party
to bring out facts ignored or-suppressed by the calling party's
examination. By direct examination and by re-direct examina-
tion the calling party may bring out any fact whatever that
assists his case. The notion that he has any need for a cross-
examination is simply unfounded. The re-direct examination is
for him a cross-examination to all intents and purposes.
(d) A fourth reason, and the one most frequently reiterated,
is the apprehension that "if a defendant could make out his
case on cross-examination, he might employ leading questions for
the purpose." This is indeed a lamentable bugbear; for it is
purely the creature of imagination. The adoption of the Fed-
eral rule will not of itself muzzle the opponent and stifle his
obnoxious leading questions; for it is clear that he may ask
them in any event. The prohibition of leading questions is
designed to prevent a willing witness from accepting the sug-
8. Even this reason would substantially disappear if sanction were given
to the recent sensible proposal of an experienced judge of the New York
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Leventritt ("The Brief," Vol. II, p. 330, June,
igoo)-namely, that the defendant be allowed a concise opening statement of
his case in opposition, immediately after the plaintiff's opening. Moreove'r,
this reason hardly applies at all to a plaintiff's cross-examination of a defend-
ant's witness.
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gestions put into his mouth by counsel; it applies, therefore,
p.rimafacie, to the counsel of the calling party, and it does not
apply, prima fade, to the cross-examining party. The rule as
to asking about one's own case on cross-examination is purely a
matter of the order of presenting facts. But the rule as to lead-
ing questions concerns the partisan disposition of the individual
witness, and depends on the supposed willingness of a partisan
witness to assist his party. Thus the rule exceptionally may be
relaxed if the witness appears hostile to the calling party, and
exceptionally may be enforced if he appears eager to befriend
the cross-examining party. Its criterion is solely the in-
dividual witness' state of mind-not the kind of fact that
is to be asked, nor the stage of asking. The very same fact
may be asked of witness Doe on cross-examination by a question
leading in form, but may not be asked of witness Roe in that
form. It is therefore a complete misconception of the principle
of leading questions to suppose that the use of leading questions
on cross-examination furnishes any objection to the opponent's
asking at that stage about the facts of his own case, or that it
supplies any reason for favoring the calling party by forcing
the cross-examiner to call the witness again so that the former
may ask leading questions.
(e) Another objection, analogous to the preceding one, but
less often mentioned, is that, but for this Federal rule, the
cross-examining party could, on cross-examination or otherwise,
impeach the witness through whom the facts of his own case are
thus proved, though he could not do so if he had been com-
pelled to call him for the purpose at a later stage. But, again,
the question occurs, Why should he not? The cross-examiner
has not called the witness, nor, by calling, represented him as
worthy of credit. Why should he not expose his lack of credit,
while at the same time utilizing the testimony in his favor for
what it may be worth? Furthermore, the opponent, even after
calling the witness himself, may still show his specific falsities,
and probably his self-contradictions; and thus but little of real
servige has been accomplished. The appearance in this con-
nection of the unreasoning and ill-deserving rule against im-
peaching one's own witness is merely another illustration of its
power to make disturbance and confusion without profit to
anyone.
4. POLICY OF THE ORTHODOX RULE. The Federal rule was
introduced by two great judges into a system of practice which
had apparently up to that time known it not. On the names of
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those judges, however, it speedily was carried into favor in
many courts. 9  Its original attraction to its propounders lay
probably in its apparently scientific allotment of suum cuique in
the presentation of the respective cases. But it remained to be
tested by experience and to be compared in operation with the
original and orthodox rule. Within a generation it had ample
opportunity for this test; and its practical weaknesses soon
became apparent enough. In the following passages will be
found the expositions of these defects as noted in experience by
some of the most eminent names in the law of evidence. The
names of Shaw, Bigelow, Martin, Campbell, Christiancy and
Cooley form a brilliant list; and the weight of their opinions
counts heavily against an unfortunate rule which has threatened
to dominate our entire system of practice:
i86i, Messrs. Douglass, Fenton, Sutherland and Avery,
arguing in Campau v. Dewey, 9 Mich, 381: "In our judgment
it [the English rule] is the only rule which leaves the course of
cross-examination sufficiently free and unobstructed to make it
effective for the attainment of truth in respect to the matters in
controversy. The rule laid down in People v. Horton [Mich.],
however plausible in theory, is exceedingly mischievous in prac-
tice. It is altogether too nice and refined for practical applica-
tion. Under it, in most litigated cases, questions of relevancy,
often of the most difficult and perplexing nature, are perpet-
ually springing up during the progress of the trial, occupying
the time of the Court, and distracting the jury with their dis-
cussion; and each of these questions must be decided by the
presiding judge upon the spot, at the peril of a reversal of thejudgment, to the great injury of the party if, from misrecollec-
tion of the witness' testimony in chief, misapprehension of the
nature of the issue, or any other cause, be commits an error,
although the error, if in the way of overruling an objection, in
most instances works no practical injustice. But this is not all.
The worst effect of the rule is that it greatly impairs the
efficiency of cross-examination. If there are any evils in the
practical working of the English rule of sufficient magnitude to
call for its modification or abandonment, they are all avoided,
as well as the evils of the rule laid down in People v. Horton, by
adopting the rule that whether a party shall be allowed to cross-
9. Professor Greenleaf's treatise appeared in i842, two years after Mr. J.
Story's opinion was rendered; and no doubt the former's treatise served as an
efficient medium for propagating the latter's rule. "The rule is now consid-
ered by the Supreme Court of the United States to be well established," is its
language (§ 445); and yet the author was unable to cite a single other author-
ity than the ruling of Floyd v. Bovard and Phila. 6- T. R. Co. v. Stimpson.
Thus the great judge's name and the author's reverence for his opinion (the
treatise was dedicated to him) combined to manufacture the rule out of whole
cloth.
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examine his adversary's witness as to the whole case, or by
leading questions, rests in the sound discretion of the Court."
186i, Christiancy, J., in Campau v. Dewey, 9 Mich. 381, 417:
"[z] When a witness is called and examined by a party, the
law and the oath impose the obligation to state the whole
truth-all the facts within the knowledge of the witness bearing
upon the question in controversy upon which his testimony is
sought. The witness may be cognizant of some facts which..
considered without reference to others equally within his
knowledge, would tend strongly to prove the issue in favor of the
party calling him; while at the same time there may be other
facts equally within his knowledge, which, considered without
reference to the former, would have an opposite tendency, or
which considered in connection with them, would explain away
or modify the former and give a very different effect to the
whole. Should a witness in such a case disclose only that class
of facts which operated in favor of the party calling him, his
testimony, though true in the detail, would be false in the
aggregate, and have all the effect of intentional falsehood; and,
if aware of the nature of the controversy in which he is called
to testify, he would be guilty of perjury as much as if he had
wilfully falsified the facts stated by him: and this whether he
were cross-examined or not. It is the disclosure of the facts
known to the witness (bearing on the issue) as a whole which
the law seeks, and a direct examination which should be per-
fectly fair would in such a case disclose both classes of facts
and present the witness' knowledge as a whole. But the party
calling the witness may so adroitly direct the examination in
chief as to disclose only that class of facts which tend to estab-
lish the issue in his favor and to conceal those which would
destroy or modify their effect. And as courts, from their
ignorance of the extent of the witness' knowledge and of the
plan arranged by the party calling him, have no means of
enforcing the perfect fairness of a direct examination, the law
has given to the opposite party the right to cross-examine the
witness, for the purpose, among others, of bringing ouit the
facts thus concealed, which tend to explain away or modify the
effect of those stated on the direct examination or to rebut the
inference which would otherwise result from them. - . . .
Such, I think, are the purely logical principles of cross-exam-
ination. . . . But there are many objections to the rule as
applied in People v. Horton. [2] It impairs the efficiency of
cross-examination as a means of detecting error and exposing
falsehood, and renders it comparatively easy for a corrupt
party, by the aid of corrupt witnesses, to fabricate fictitious
cases without the risk of impeachment, compelling the opposite
party to make the witness his own as to facts which might tend
to modify the effect of his evidence; thus precluding the power
of impeachment. [3] It tends to break up into detached and
widely-separated fragments the state of facts within the
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knowledge of the witness bearing upon the same main point,
and which would be much better understood if stated as one
connected whole. The testimony of other (and perhaps many
other) witnesses intervening between the parts of the witness'
testimony, the jury are more likely to confound the testimony
of one witness with that of another. The bearing of the differ-
ent parts of the witness' testimony upon each other, and any
discrepancies which may exist, are not so easily discovered, and
consequently the credit of the witness is not so correctly
estimated. [4] But there is a practical difficulty in'the applica-
tion of this rule (as understood in People v. Horton), inherent in
the rule itself, and which can only be avoided by getting rid of
the rule as there applied. It adopts, as the test of the relevancy
of a cross-examination, the bearing of the particular facts sought
to be elicited by it upon the particular facts brought out on the
direct examination; instead of the main fact or facts which
these particular facts tend to prove; and as these particular
facts are often very numerous, and their number and character
incapable of restriction, and the question of relevancy may
arise upon any two of them, and as the degrees of relation
between them may be as numerous and varied as the facts
themselves, it is easy to see that questions of this kind must be
constantly arising, till the case bristles with points of rele-
vancy. The rule therefore leads to almost infinite embarass-
ment; and it must and often does require more time to dispose
of these questions of relevancy (under this rule thus under-
stood) than would otherwise be required for the trial of the
cause. "
1878. Cooley, J., in New York Iron Mine v. Negaunee Bank, 39
Mich.. 644, 659 (after quoting Mr. J. Campbell's words similar
to those supra): "One might suppose, after reading this lan-
guage, that it was written in anticipation of the proceedings in
this very case. . . . Here the matter in issue was confined
to the single point of Wetmore's authority to make and indorse
the paper sued upon.', . . . But although he was the first
witness called, and the case involved nothing but paper made
or indorsed by himself, he was not asked respecting his signa-
tures, and the notes were not offered in evidence while he was
upon the stand. The reason for this was apparent as soon as
the cross-examination commenced; for when the witness was
asked any questions concerning the notes, the purpose of which
was to show that he had signed or indorsed them without
authority and in fraud of defendant, and that he had admitted
that such was the fact, objection was at once interposed on
behalf of the plaintiff; and the circuit judge, remarking that
the witness had given no testimony in reference to the notes
nor had any testimony been introduced by any other party in
reference to them nor had the notes been put in evidence, sus-
io. The next two sentences are for clearness' sake transferred here from
the preceding page of the opinion.
ONE'S OWN CASE ON CROSS-EXAMIYATIO. 3i
tained the objection. The questions on behalf of the plaintiff
had been carefully restricted to that part of the facts which it
was supposed would tend in its favor, and in respect to which
a cross-examination could not be damaging, and were intended.
instead of eliciting the whole truth, to conceal whatever would
favor the defense. The witness, instead of being required,
according to the obligation of his oath, to tell the whole truth,
had been carefully limited to something less than the whole;
and when questions were asked calculated to supply his omis-
sions, they were ruled out because they did not relate to the
precise circumstances which the plaintiff had thought it for his
interest to call out. It would be difficult to present a more
striking illustration of the error in the rule in People v. Horton
than is afforded by this case. For here was the principal actor
in the transaction under investigation brought forward as a
witness to support his own acts, but carefully examined in such
a manner as to avoid having him utter a single word regarding
the main fact-though it was peculiarly within his own
knowledge-and even his handwriting was left to be proved by
another. In that manner he was made to conceal not merely a
part of the transaction but a principal part, and made to tell,
not the whole truth according to the obligation of his oath, but a
small fraction only-a fraction, too, that was important only as it
bore upon the main fact which was so carefully kept out of sight
while this witness was giving his evidence. It is true, the
defense was at liberty to call the witness subsequently; but this
is no answer; the defense was not compellable to give credit to
the plaintiff's witness as its own for the purposes of an explana-
tion of facts constituting the plaintiff's case and a part of
which the plaintiff had put before the jury when examining
him. One of the mischiefs of the rule in People v. Horton was
that it encouraged a practice not favorable to justice, whereby
a party was compelled to make an unfriendly witness his own,
after the party calling him had managed to present a one-
sided and essentially false account of the facts, by artfully
aiding the witness to give such glimpses of the truth only as
would favor his own side of the issue. What has been said on
this point has in substance been said many times before. The
necessity of repeating it is a singular illustration of the diffi-
culty with which a mischievous but plausible precedent is
sometimes got rid of."" 1
The chief objections to the Federal rule may be sum-
marized as three in number; and although these apply in
aggravated degree to its degenerate form only, and not to its
original and pure form, nevertheless, as already suggested
(ante § 2), the rule must be reckoned with as it usually is
applied, and not as it might be. (l) The necessity of determin-
it. In Detroit &- M. R. Co. v. van Steinburg, r7 Mich. 99, Iog, the
same judge had forcibly expounded the evils of the rule here repudiated.
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ing, for each question on cross-examination, whether the fact
inquired for is properly a part of the case of one or the other
party produces delay, propagates confusion, and increases the
opportunities for securing a re-trial on trifling errors of ruling
which do not affect the merits of the cause or the truth of the
facts. Even under a strict system of pleading, this possibility
is great; but under the prevailing loose system of pleading,
they are legion. Morover, under the degenerate form of the
rule not even the rules of pleading can furnish a guide; the line
of distinction changes with every witness, it is both variable
and uncertain; and it requires either an impossible feat of
memory or a constant perusal of a stenographic report to ascer-
tain the standard of decision. Thus are caused additional labor
in preparation for trial, delay and confusion in its progress, and
an increased contingency that the work must be done over
again at a new trial. (2) The opportunities for successful
unfair tactics are increased, by enabling the calling party to
suppress part of the facts, so as to oblige the cross-examiner to
call the witness later as his own. 12 The latter's right to do
this is for him usually no just equivalent; first, because the
proper time to extract the desired facts effectively is the time
mmediately after the direct examination; and, secondly,
because with a hostile witness it is often dangerous, if not im-
possible, to attempt to obtain the facts fully at the later stage.
The result is (as the calling party hopes) often to prevent the
cross-examiner from obtaining the desired facts at all, because
he does not feel justified in risking the exercise of his right to
call the witness subsequently; and this evil is the more em-
phasized where the witness is himself the party opposed to the
cross-examiner. (3) It hampers the cross-examiner subjectively
in exercising the fundamental right of cross-examination; be-
cause, in many jurisdictions following this rule, the erratic
corollary is enforced that, by asking about his own case on
cross-examination, the opposing party makes the witness his
own and therefore becomes unable to discredit him, the conse-
quence being that the cross-examiner feels himself in constant
danger of overstepping the line and losing his right to expose a
false witness, and thus is obliged to leave a large margin for
safety. That this produces an unnecessary labor and responsi-
blity; and has inevitably a dulling effect upon what should be the
sharp weapon of cross-examination, must be apparent. In this
respect the rule has a vicious indirect effect in helping to dis-
12. Particularly in the case of an accused offering himself as a witness.
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arm the opponent of his greatest protection against fraud and
perjury. A perusal of some of the modem rulings enforcing
this pedantic application discloses better than anything else the
degenerate and pettifogging influence of the rule in question.
These objections, together with other minor ones noted by
the various judges, ought to be enough to stem the progress of
this rule. In its two generations of existence it has gone into
many courts; but in most of these it is not too late to turn-if
not to repudiate the rule at least to revise and restore it to its
original and pure form. It was accepted in almost every
instance merely upon authority, and under the belief that it
was, in the eminent jurist's language, "well, established."
Since the test of experience has passed, few have been found to
defend it; nor can it be successfully defended. It has some-
times been called the American rule. It is not yet entitled to
that name, and it is to be hoped that it never will be.
5. MICHIGAN RULE; CROSS-EXAMINATION TO FACTS MODIFYING
THE DIRECT EXAMINATION. It has already been noted that, so
far as the Federal rule has any claim to scientific orderliness,
it rests on the assumption that to each party is apportioned a
stage of the trial for the presentation of the facts supporting his
own case, and that it is proper for him to present the evidence
of those facts in that stage only. Hence, the extent of the
prohibition, as it affects the cross-examiner, is limited to those
facts which would have formed a part of his own affirmative case
at a later stage. In this, the pure and only plausible form of
the rule, the cross-examiner may still inquire as to all facts
which modify or explain away the effect of the facts brought out on
the direct examination; and the prohibition applies only to his own
affirmative case, since the former class of facts would not in
themselves be a part of the cross-examiner's own case. This
form of the rule is still open to the first and perhaps other
objections already noted. But, unfortunately, the originating
words of Justice Story and of Chief-Justice Gibson prohibiting
all except "facts connected with the matters stated in his direct
examination," gave to the rule a much broader and a wholly
unscientific form. In the result (contrary, perhaps, to their
real expectations) the latter form, based upon their literal
expressions, came to be accepted in most of the courts follow-
ing their rule producing in its application the most serious of
the disadvantages latent in it. Against this degenerate form
and its practical results, a number of courts have earnestly
protested. These have striven, while accepting the rule, to
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enforce it in its pure and only defensible form, and to diminish
its rigor by a generous interpretation. There is a difficulty in
defining the line of distinction, especially under a loose system
of pleading; but the general purpose and theory is plain
enough. This form of the rule may be termed the Michigan
rule since the Court of Michigan has not only most fully
expounded it but has by its sound exposition done particular
service in arresting the progress of the inferior form:
x862, Campbell, J., in Chandler v. Allison, zo Mich. 460, 477:
"The principal point in controversy was whether Allison had
an unqualified present interest as a tenant of Chandler. That
he was a tenant was conceded, and the only point in issue on
that subject was whether, under the terms of his holding,
Chandler had a right to require him to leave, in order to rebuild
upon the premises. The questions put to the witness [Allison,
the plaintiff, testifying for himself in an action of trespass
against Chandler for expelling him] were aimed at ascertaining
the precise terms of the letting . . . It is difficult to per-
ceive any principle upon which such questions can be held im-
proper on cross-examination. The only object of this process
is to elicit the whole truth concerning transactions which may
be supposed to have been only partially explained, and where
the whole truth would present them in a different light.
Whenever an entire transaction is in issue, evidence which con-
ceals a part of it is defective, and does not comply with the
primary obligation of the oath, which is designed to elicit the
whole transaction.. ... When the answers are given, the
nature and extent of the transaction becomes known from a
comparison of the whole, and each fact material to a compre.
hension of the rest is equally important and pertinent."
188x, Brewer, J., in Blake v. Powell, 26 Kan. 320, 326: "A
cross-examination is not limited to the very day and exact fact
named in the direct examination. It may extend to other
matters which limit, qualify, or explain the facts stated on the
direct examination, or modify the inferences deducible there-
from, providing only that such matters are directly connected
with the facts testified to in chief."
6. STATE OF THE LAW IN THE VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS. (a)
With reference to the discretionary power of the trial Court to
allow variations from the customary order, it is clear that this
is an inherent assumption in each rule as properly understood.
The courts following the orthodox rule seldom forget this; and
the courts in which the Federal rule originated (Pennsylvania
and the Federal Court) are still found recognizing it fully, and
declining ordinarily to consider as an error any variation
sanctioned by the trial court. But in many of the courts fol-
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lowing the latter rule, the qualification as to discretion is
usually ignored, and the rule is enforced in its most bigoted
form.
(b) With reference to the customary scope of the facts that
may be sought on cross-examination, the inferior form of the
Federal rule is found now applied in the majority of jurisdic-
tions. In a large minority the orthodox rule prevails. In a
small minority (notably Michigan and California) the better
form of the Federal rule (termed above the Michigan rtile) is
carefully enforced. As between the two forms of the Federal
rule, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain which has been
adopted, and there are sub-varieties of it. As applied to the
.party-opponent testifying in a civil case, the extreme rule is apt
to be modified; as applied to an accused taking the stand in his
own favor, the rule is often attempted to be juggled with,1 3 and
is also subject to confusion with other principles.
7. QUALIFICATIONS OF EACH RULE. (a) Under the orthodox
rule, it is of course assumed that there can be no inquiry on
cross-examination as to facts not properly then in issue under
the pleadings. 14  But where there are joint opponents, the facts
in issue are presumably available on cross-examination by any
one of them. 1 5 Where the witness is himself the party on
whose behalf the counsel is cross-examining, and has been
called by the first party, there seems to be no reason why the
same scope of questioning should not be allowed;' 6 although
13. Compare the rulings in California and Missouri, intended to prevent
this. As applied to an accused the rule is particularly absurd, because the
prosecution cannot call him as its own witness.
14. i859, Bracegirdle v. Bailey, i F. & F. 536 (matter not pleaded at
all); 183o, Hartness v. Boyd, 5 Wend. 563 (through lack of an affidavit of
merits, the cause was conducted on the plaintiff's pleading as an "inquest"
only); 1841, Kerker v. Carter, i Hill ioi (similar).
1S. 1842, Fletcher v. Crosbie, 2 Mo. & Rob. 417 (counsel for a defendant
who had suffered judgment and was interested only as to the amount of dam-
ages was allowed to cross-examine to the whole case with a view to establish-
ing the liability of other defendants, since he would be liable for costs on his
plea in abatement if they were not guilty).
16. Contra: 1863, Bell v. Chambers, 38 Ala. 66o, 664 (he does not become
"a general witness in the cause," and therefore cannot be examined "on any
matter of defense not called out by the plaintiff in his examination"). But the
cases cited in the preceding section do not make this exception.
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the questions should not be leading in form. 17 Where the wit-
ness is the party-opponent to the cross-examiner, no difference
is called for. 17
(b) Under the Federal rule, it is clear that it does not pro-
hibit cross-examination to one's own case where the calling
party has been allowed in his direct examination to bring out
facts in rebuttal of a prospective defense,' 8 nor where with the
trial court's consent- the opponent has postponed the cross-
examination until after he has begun his own case in reply.
Furthermore, it is certain that the discrediting of the witness
by any allowable mode whatever is not a part of the opponent's
own case, within the meaning of the rule, and may therefore be
pursued without restraint on cross-examination.' 9 Neverthe-
less, such is the latent power of confusion inherent in the rule,
that even this elementary postulate is sometimes lost sight of;
so that a court is found to refuse to let the opponent on cross-
examination ask about a prior self-contradiction; the result
being that, when the opponent recalls him for the purpose, hie
is met by the rule against impeaching one's own witness, and
the court is obliged to evade an unendurable ruling by the
novel suggestion that if in discretion the question is excluded
on the cross-examination, it must then be allowed at the later
stage. 2 0 Under the Federal rule, finally, is sometimes found
an exception for a party-opponent as a witness.
fohn H. Wigmore.
17. Whether such a party-witness may be imfieached by the cross-
examiner is of course a different question.
x8. x896, Kenny v. Walker, 29 Or. 4!, 44 Pac. 5O.
ig. I881, State v. Willingham, 33 La. An. 537. Few counsel have been
hardy enough to raise the doubt.
2o. An example of this is the following case: xgoo, Clary v. Hardeville
Brick Co., ioo Fed. 9x5.
